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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the trade-off between leveraging external sources of innovation by 
outsourcing design and engineering activities and the ability to develop internal product 
development competences. The trade-off arises because the division of labor within and 
across firms’ boundaries has a crucial role in shaping competence development processes, 
especially because the division of labor also influences opportunities for learning by doing. 
In new product development projects, learning by doing appears to be both a key 
determinant of competence development and a difficult-to-substitute form of learning. 
While the division of development tasks is often considered as guided by product 
architecture, we show that by decoupling the decisions concerning the product architecture 
and the allocation of development tasks, firms can realize the benefits of outsourcing such 
tasks while developing new internal competences. Drawing on a longitudinal case study in 
the automotive industry, we also identify a new organizational lever for shaping 
competence development paths and for designing firm boundaries. This lever consists in 
alternating different task allocation schemes over time for different types of development 
projects. We show why this is a novel solution, what its underlying logic is, and how it 
enables alleviating the trade-off between the benefits of leveraging external sources of 
innovation and the opportunities for competence development provided by in-house design 
and engineering. We discuss implications for theories of organizational boundary design 
and innovation management. 
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1. Introduction 
A key question for firms that develop complex products is what type 
of competences they should retain in-house and what rationale they should 
follow in taking this decision. Since complex products such as automobiles, 
software, or PCs embody heterogeneous and rapidly changing technologies, 
involving external sources of innovation has become a necessity for 
innovating firms. Pressures to increase strategic flexibility and reduce 
development costs have made involving external sources of innovation even 
more attractive. Firms that produce complex products, such as Toyota, 
Microsoft, or HP therefore have to choose what technological competences 
to build up and maintain in house and which ones to outsource. 
In considering this question, literature has used many different 
analytical lenses and different rationales, leading to different prescriptions. 
Transaction cost economics, the resource based view and the knowledge 
based view, to cite just a few, have developed thorough insights into this 
fundamental choice. More recent contributions have systematically 
considered the interdependences between vertical scope and competence 
development: in choosing their boundaries, firms not only influence the 
division of labor in their industry but also the trajectory of their 
competences development (Argyres, 1999; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; 
Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Teece, 2007). 
Despite their differences, a common thread runs through these 
different literatures. It is represented by the assumption that the decisions 
concerning the product architecture  (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) guide and 
constrain the decisions concerning the division of labor of innovation tasks 
within and across firms’ boundaries (henceforth ‘task allocation’). Given a 
particular decomposition of the product in different systems and modules 
(e.g. the safety and entertainment systems in a car or the motherboard and 
the storage system in a PC), firms decide which of those systems and 
modules to develop in house, and for which ones the development will be 
outsourced to system and module suppliers. This approach is particularly 
common in the innovation management literature, where product 
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architecture is considered the dominating criterion for the allocation of 
development tasks (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Several authors have argued 
that the structure of a product development organization “mirrors” the 
architecture of the product it develops (von Hippel, 1990; Henderson and 
Clark, 1990; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Teece, 1996; Chesbrough and 
Teece, 1996; Fine, 1998; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sturgeon, 2002; 
MacCormack et al., 2006; Colfer, 2007). For instance, integral products 
require an integral organization that develops them, while modular products 
require a modular organization (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996, Langlois and 
Robertson, 1995: 300).  
The idea that product architecture and organization architecture 
‘mirror’ each other has been disputed, however, both on empirical and 
theoretical grounds. From a theoretical perspective, some dissenting voices 
in the literature argue that the centrality of product architecture in guiding 
decisions such as task allocation, might have been pushed too far, pointing 
to the technological determinism inherent in emphasizing product 
architecture as a criterion for allocating development tasks (Sako, 2003). 
The occasion to accumulate empirical evidence was provided by the trend 
towards design and engineering outsourcing in the 1990’s (see for example 
the predictions of Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996 and Sturgeon, 2002) that 
often leveraged product architecture as an enabler. As it turns out, for many 
firms outsourcing design and engineering tasks guided by modular product 
architecture led to problematic consequences, such a substantial decay of 
architectural knowledge and a subsequent loss of control over development 
projects (Lincoln et al., 1998; Takeishi, 2001, 2002; Chesbrough and 
Kusunoki, 2001). Empirical evidence indicates a gap in our understanding 
of the impact of product architecture on task allocation, in particular as a 
response to the question of what type of competences firms developing 
complex products should retain in-house and what rationale they should 
follow in taking this decision. For example, task allocation decisions can 
generate extremely negative consequences on a firms’ ability to understand 
the components of a product and to integrate them into a system, leading to 
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decaying project performance (Fine, 1998; Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 
2002). The question is: given the need of leveraging external sources of 
innovation, how can firms avoid the negative consequences of outsourcing 
design and engineering tasks? How can firms assure they develop internal 
competences on new technologies? How can firms assure they also develop 
the competence to integrate new with old competences, and deploy both in 
developing new products? 
When negative consequences of outsourcing design and engineering 
tasks materialize, the dominant response provided by management literature 
is to in-source, i.e. to reduce the level of design and engineering 
outsourcing. The inevitable outcome of such a reaction is, however, that 
firms embark in a difficult, time and resource consuming process of trial 
and error regarding the appropriate amount of design and engineering to 
carry out in-house (e.g. Mac Duffie, 2008). As shown below, this answer is 
unsatisfactory because in-sourcing substantially trades off the benefits of 
knowledge specialization, provided by leveraging external sources of 
innovation, with the benefits of accumulating competences for designing 
and engineering new products.  
In the remainder of the paper, we not only provide an in-depth 
analysis of the reasons for such trade-off but also propose a response. We 
develop our insights on the basis of a 10-year research carried out at Fiat 
Auto (henceforth Fiat), a major player in the world automotive industry, 
Fiat’s two research centers and 16 of its first-tier suppliers. We document 
and analyze the solutions that Fiat chose to respond to the need of 
integrating external sources of innovation, and how it was implemented. We 
claim that such an in-depth and long-term empirical research is particularly 
suited for providing a better understanding of the issues at stake. Our 
empirical data consists in interviews and company documents. The 
deliberate goal of the empirical research was to trace the evolution of the 
strategy and implementation of design and engineering tasks allocation of 
Fiat and its impact on the competence development process and competence 
distribution in the industry. Our focused research strategy allowed the 
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observation of the full circle Fiat went through, all the way from complete 
vertical integration in design and engineering, to extreme design and 
engineering outsourcing. Oscillating between these two ends of the 
continuum is common for many firms. Extreme design and engineering 
outsourcing, however, led Fiat very close to failure. In particular, a specific 
circumstance makes our case especially interesting: when the problems 
triggered by outsourcing were acknowledged, Fiat was not able to pursue in-
sourcing to acquire new competences for lack of time and financial 
resources. This apparently hopeless situation induced a major organizational 
change that represents a novel response to the problem. The most important 
measure adopted by Fiat was that Fiat did not any more try to get the 
‘degree of outsourcing’ right but rather, focused on designing its product 
development organization. Recognizing that the allocation of development 
tasks does not have to be constrained by the product architecture, it 
employed an instrument (the template process) that permitted alternating 
between different task allocation schemes for different project types. This 
instrument had a systematic impact on firm boundaries – importantly, it 
allowed both aligning the knowledge and task boundaries more closely and 
making sure that Fiat’s knowledge exceeded the knowledge needed for the 
immediate tasks at hand (Brusoni et al., 2001), but without changing its 
vertical scope. Therefore, Fiat shifted the focus of its efforts from deciding 
about the degree of outsourcing development tasks to deciding about its 
organization design, which allowed it to align its knowledge and task 
boundaries but without a massive increase in its engineering staff. This 
finding sheds light on several aspects of crucial relevance to innovation 
management and firm boundaries design. 
Concerning the link between the division of labor and competence 
development in complex product innovation, we show that design and 
engineering task allocation has a major impact on competence development 
as it decides on the allocation of learning opportunities. As Henderson & 
Clark (1990) have argued, task allocation and the following decisions 
concerning the organizational structure, constrain learning processes and 
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thus the firm’s ability to develop and acquire competences, including new 
competences. We add further empirical details on the drivers of such 
learning processes showing why and how system integrators benefit from 
learning by doing processes. We show that this form of learning is 
necessary to maintain a full grasp on project and product performance. 
These insights extend but also partially revisit existing literature on system 
integration (Brusoni et al., 2001, Takeishi, 2001, 2002).  
Our work also contributes to a better understanding of the logic 
underlying the division of labor within and across firms’ boundaries. We 
submit that the literature still overvalues the role of product architecture in 
taking decisions concerning design and engineering task allocation and 
question the tight link between product architecture and organization 
architecture. On this point, our work adds to previous literature that has 
criticized the emphasis on the role of modular product architectures in the 
decision of outsourcing development tasks (Brusoni, 2005, Fixson and Park, 
2008), to the debate of modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), to the literature 
on managing innovation of complex products (Hobday et al., 2005), and to 
the innovation management literature more generally.  
Finally, we offer insights that can contribute to existing theories on 
organizational boundary design. We observe that firms can influence 
competence development processes without leveraging vertical scope, thus 
adding to a recent turn in boundary design research that has provided 
empirical evidence to advance the notion of firm’s boundary beyond the 
traditional emphasis on vertical scope (Harrigan, 1984; Heide, 2003; 
Jacobides & Billinger, 2006; Rothaermel et al., 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; 
Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). We also add a new firm boundary design 
principle – alternating between different task allocation schemes over time. 
Moreover, we identify an organizational instrument for implementing that 
principle, i.e., alternating between different project types (template and 
derivative projects). Each project type uses a different task allocation 
scheme. We can thus expect a boundary change when that design principle 
is employed.  
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In the next section, we first review previous research on the issue. 
Section three then explains the method applied in the empirical research, 
while section four describes the empirical findings. Section five discusses 
the findings and presents the main implications of our research. Section six 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Previous research 
2.1 The dominant approach to division of labor and task allocation in 
innovation management 
The dominant stream in the innovation management literature 
currently turns around the concept of ‘design rules’ (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000). Design rules are made up of the product’s architecture, interfaces, 
integration protocols and testing standards (Baldwin and Clark, 2000: 77). 
They capture ‘architectural knowledge’, i.e., knowledge about how to 
decompose the products into components and how they are linked together 
and integrated into the final product (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Design 
rules play an important role in determining the division of labor of 
innovation tasks and their allocation to different actors, and also in 
explaining industry evolution. One of the most prominent features of 
research on design rules is that it revolves around the concept of modularity 
(Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006: 179; Ulrich, 1995; Sanchez, 1997; Baldwin 
and Clark, 2000). Modularity refers to a decomposition scheme that 
assumes independence between modules, with interdependences confined 
within modules’ boundaries (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) 1. Some parts of the 
literature have suggested that modular product architecture can serve as a 
good map for the decomposition of the development task and task allocation 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Product 
architecture therefore is used as the task decomposition scheme.  
                                                 
1 A somewhat different but also influential definition of modularity has been given 
by Ulrich: key to modular architectures is a one-to-one mapping from functional elements 
to the physical components of the product, which specifies de-coupled interfaces between 
components (Ulrich, 1995: 422). We follow Baldwin & Clark’s (2000) definition here. See 
Campagnolo and Camuffo (2009) for an overview and a discussion on the concept and 
many definitions of modularity. 
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Modular task decomposition has powerful implications on make or 
buy decisions. Firstly, modular decomposition (with standardized 
interfaces) provides new possibilities for outsourcing. Standardized 
interfaces generate ‘market modularity’, i.e., a situation in which ‘suppliers 
can opt to provide some portion of the system, without fear of disrupting 
other parts of that system’ (Chesbrough, 2003: 179). Modular 
decomposition is supposed to have beneficial effects on coordination as it 
enables independent problem-solving for each module, while standardized 
interfaces assure that all modules will fit together without the need to bring 
about such a fit by organizational coordination. These features make it much 
easier to draw on the competences of external suppliers and other partners in 
the innovation network (Sturgeon, 2002). Secondly, modular decomposition 
enables knowledge specialization. As Sanchez writes, ‘the standardizing of 
component interfaces based on the firm’s current architectural knowledge 
largely decouples architectural knowledge-based processes from the 
component-level knowledge used to develop specific component design 
during product development’ (Sanchez, 2003: 382). Modular product 
architecture thus enables specialization in architectural knowledge for the 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).  
The literature on systems integration has extended this idea. As 
Hobday et al. (2005: 1128) write, what is typical of systems integrators is 
that ‘the lead firm moves away from an in-depth control over component 
design and manufacture to the systems integration knowledge and skills 
needed to integrate the modules produced by others in the supply chain’. In 
other words, architectural knowledge holds the key to successful systems 
integration. The dominant perspective in the literature thus gives strong 
emphasis to product architecture, as a guide for what design tasks to 
outsource.  
 
 
2.2 The limits of outsourcing: the role of component specific knowledge 
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Empirical research has identified limits to some of the key ideas of 
the dominant approach, however. The first limit arises from incomplete 
decomposability of complex products; they often are nearly, rather than 
fully, decomposable (Simon, 1962). This difference is important because it 
is impossible to decompose such products so that no interdependences at all 
will remain between the chunks into which the product is decomposed. 
Empirical research has found that in order to address the remaining 
interdependences, component-specific knowledge is required (Takeishi, 
2002). Component-specific knowledge also matters for a second reason, i.e., 
because product technologies can change (including the interdependences 
between parts of the product). Product architectures need to be adapted over 
time to counter the risk of being stuck with an inadequate decomposition 
scheme (resulting in not addressing the remaining interdependences and 
thus, loss of control of product performance) (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 
2001; Brusoni et al., 2001). Again, in order to be able to adapt 
decomposition schemes according to interdependences, component-specific 
knowledge is required (Brusoni, et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2002). Thirdly, 
empirical studies in the Japanese automotive industry have concluded that 
component-specific knowledge is particularly important in the case of 
technological newness (Takeishi, 2002). The reason is that new technology 
is less well-understood and thus, an understanding of the interdependences 
with other components of the system can only be developed through strong 
knowledge of the component-specific technology of the other components. 
Brusoni et al. (2001) make a similar argument for the importance of 
component-specific knowledge by pointing to the uneven rates of 
development in the technologies on which the firm’s products rely, and 
unpredictable product-level interdependences. Brusoni et al.’s (2001: 597) 
argument is that having component-specific knowledge ‘in excess of what 
[firms] need for what they make enables firms to cope with imbalances 
caused by uneven rates of development in the technologies on which they 
rely, and with unpredictable product-level interdependences’. In other 
words, component-specific knowledge holds the key for avoiding some of 
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the main problems in developing complex products. All these arguments 
highlight the role of component-specific knowledge in preventing decaying 
project performance due to problems in integrating systems (which involves 
building architectural knowledge) and designing product performance on 
the level of the car as a whole.2 In order to avoid this problem, it is essential 
that firms nurture their component-specific knowledge (Fine, 1998; 
Takeishi, 2002). One of the most important means for nurturing this 
knowledge is to maintain a certain level of direct involvement in the design 
and engineering of components and systems by innovating firms (Takeishi, 
2002). Such involvement provides occasion for learning by doing, 
particularly important for acquiring tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958; Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995), and for accumulating competence, i.e., being able to 
apply knowledge (Orlikowski, 2002).  
 
2.3 Tensions in the different approaches to task allocation  
The empirical research described above evidences a trade-off. On the 
one hand, there are the benefits of knowledge specialization. In the case of 
modular product architecture, some firms (e.g. “system integrators”) can 
specialize in architectural knowledge, while other firms (e.g. suppliers) can 
specialize in component-specific knowledge. Modular product architecture 
(with standardized interfaces) also facilitates allocating the development of 
modules to suppliers. Therefore, it also becomes easier to draw on outside 
sources of innovation. On the other hand, carrying out design tasks in-house 
has the benefit of providing learning opportunities (through learning by 
doing) regarding component-specific knowledge, which nurtures 
component-specific knowledge. Table 1 provides a summary.  
Table 1 HERE 
                                                 
2 Lack of component-specific knowledge can trigger a second, related set of problems. An 
inferior level of component-specific knowledge relative to suppliers’ component-specific 
knowledge can lead to dependence on suppliers for such knowledge (Fine, 1998), giving 
rise to problems with governing suppliers due to increased information asymmetries, a shift 
in bargaining power and higher transaction costs. In this paper, we focus on the problem of 
loss of control of product performance, not on the implications for governance.  
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Apparently, these two alternatives are diametrically opposed. One can 
either carry out a task in-house or allocate it to a supplier. Depending on this 
decision (and the allocation of the learning opportunities), either the benefits 
of knowledge specialization (in architectural knowledge) or of nurturing 
component-specific knowledge will accrue. It is important to note that once 
we acknowledge such a tension, to attain the benefits of involving external 
sources of innovation seems a non-trivial challenge. In the case of products 
that are not decomposable in a fully modular way, the possibilities of 
leveraging external sources of innovation are thus constrained. In fact, in the 
case of products that cannot be modularized to some degree, in 
circumstances of technological newness, technological change, uneven rates 
of change of components, or unpredictable product-level interdependences, 
firms are advised to maintain a broader knowledge base than the one 
required for the actual products and thus, to keep the pertaining design tasks 
in-house to avoid the problems identified in the literature (Brusoni et al., 
2001)3.  
It is worth noting that the circumstances identified above are 
common, and indeed, characteristic, for many industries. Moreover, to 
implement the advice, a firm would need to build up a huge staff in order to 
cover the increasing range of technologies incorporated in some products. 
Firms in the circumstances identified above are thus left with no option 
other than to attempt some fine-tuning of the degree of outsourcing of 
                                                 
3 Of course, adapting the allocation of innovation tasks (e.g., vertically integrating) or the 
product architecture is not the only way to respond to the trade-off. One could also manage 
it by relying on organizational measures such as different forms of networked innovation 
and relational practices that OEMs should implement in order to maximize the operational 
benefits (cost, quality and lead times) linked to the involvement of suppliers in the OEM’s 
NPD (New Product Development) process (covering such means as the use of contracts, 
ICT tools, joint teams, and co-location of engineers) (Helper, 1991, Lamming 1993, 
Smitka, 1991, Nishiguchi, 1994, Helper & Sako, 1995, Helper et al. 2000, Sako, 2004). 
Fine and Whitney (1996), however, show that even in the case of a partnership with 
suppliers, the OEM should never be ‘dependent for knowledge’, i.e. it should hold some 
component-specific knowledge. Helper et al. (2000) arrive at similar conclusions, 
emphasizing the importance of relying on ‘learning by monitoring’ to enhance ‘pragmatic 
collaborations’ as a way for integrating external sources of innovation. Learning by 
monitoring does not work, however, if the OEM lacks component-specific knowledge. This 
once again supports the argument that the OEM should retain some component-specific 
knowledge in-house in order to manage supplier relationships successfully. There seem to 
be no ways around the trade-off.  
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design tasks to suppliers, in order to balance the two antagonistic forces. For 
lack of more precise advice, this is likely to be implemented in a trial and 
error process. Summing up research on the issue, MacDuffie (2008: 42) 
argues that firms developing complex products such as cars should ‘develop 
the capability to experiment and move activities back and forth across 
organizational boundaries’.  
We believe this advice on how firms should manage the tension 
between product architecture, boundary design and competence 
development is reasonable but not satisfactory, both from a managerial and 
a theoretical perspective. Given the uncertainty that is inherent to innovation 
activities, accepting the necessity to rely on trial and error in defining the 
boundary of the firm means to accept that the fate of innovating firms is left 
to serendipity, at least in the short term. A firm that has decided to leverage 
the modularity of electronic hardware in the product architecture of a car, 
would, for instance, outsource electronic hardware components to suppliers 
and, de facto, not design and manufacture such electronic hardware in-
house. This was exactly what happened to some car makers in the nineties 
(our interview at Fiat, 1998). This strategy seemed to work at the beginning. 
However, as the use of electronics was spreading in subsequent generations 
of cars, car makers realized that electronic hardware and software were 
turning the car into a more integral product. Thus, they needed to develop 
in-house competences on electronics, but also competences regarding the 
integration of electronics systems in the overall product. However, since in-
sourcing takes time and money, many car makers experienced a lot of 
problems in integrating electronics in the mean time, with negative effects 
on their product performance and customer satisfaction. Product 
architecture, and the assumption of its modularity, turned out a bad guide 
for deciding how to allocate design tasks. Moreover, the consequences of 
the error and the resources (time, money and competences) needed for a 
new trial can leave firms with huge problems. We decided to direct our 
research to the question how firms can enable leveraging external sources of 
innovation while avoiding the negative consequences of relying on design 
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and engineering outsourcing. Our particular interest is in how firms can 
assure they develop internal competences on new technologies, including 
the competence to integrate the new technologies into the product. 
The next two sections describe how we gathered our data, and the 
main findings. 
 
 
3. Method, unit of analysis and sampling  
Given the exploratory nature of the research question, we chose the 
case study method. To describe the evolution of product development 
competences in the case of design and engineering outsourcing, we present 
longitudinal evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989, Pettigrew, 1990, Yin, 1994) on the 
New Product Development (NPD) process of a technology-intensive firm 
developing complex products. In particular, we focused on: (1) the decisions 
(and the rationale applied in making those decisions) concerning the 
allocation of innovation tasks along the value chain, with specific interest on 
the outsourcing of design and engineering tasks to suppliers; (2) the effects 
that task allocation produced on the firm and its suppliers’ knowledge and 
competence base; and (3) the firm’s organization for product innovation.  
We chose the sampling approach following the argument that “cases 
are selected because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and 
extending relationships and logic among constructs” (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007: 27). The sampling process was based on two steps. First, 
we chose to gather our empirical observations in the context of the 
automotive industry. The automotive industry is one of the most complex 
industries in terms of technologies and players involved in innovation 
processes. Moreover, in the nineties, the auto industry went through a 
paradigmatic shift in the design and engineering of cars due to the broad 
introduction of electronics into the vehicle’s main systems (e.g., the power 
train system) (Maxton and Wormald, 2004). This circumstance, as 
exemplified below, provided the research opportunity of investigating 
design and engineering outsourcing at a key turning moment for the 
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industry. Moreover, the auto industry offers an extensive variety of 
situations concerning the effects of the product architecture on the division 
of development tasks and their coordination (Takeishi and Fujimoto, 2003).   
Second, we selected the carmaker: Fiat. Headquartered in Italy, Fiat is 
a multi-brand company whose product range covers all market segments, 
from luxury to small cars, from trucks to Formula 1 racing. In 2009, Fiat 
acquired a significant stake in Chrysler, one of the American “big three”, re-
gaining the role of a major player in the industry. Fiat, a previously fully 
vertically integrated company (as far as design tasks are concerned), became 
an extreme outsourcer and subsequently decided to once more reverse its 
task allocation scheme. These changes were observable within a time-span 
of only 10-15 years.4 The description of these changes and the in-depth 
analysis of their triggers were well-suited to address our research questions. 
Finally, both authors are bilingual and gained privileged access to a 
company whose managers did not generally speak English.  
We also included in the sample Fiat’s two research centers, as well as 
16 first-tier suppliers belonging to Fiat’s value chain. Suppliers were chosen 
on the basis of the following criteria: relevance in terms of contribution to 
Fiat’s development activities, heterogeneity of their industry, technologies, 
dimension, ownership, and nationality, and their independence from Fiat.  
Two main data collection methods were used. The first was the study 
of archival sources to define the characteristics of the sector and the history 
of the selected companies. The second involved extensive semi-structured 
interviews with managers in the selected companies and industry experts. 
Such data gathering enabled triangulation between the quantitative and 
qualitative data, and between what managers belonging to different 
organizations had to say on the same units of analysis. Moreover, the 
                                                 
4 The case, therefore, offers at least as much insight into industry evolution as the 
electronics industry – the paradigmatic example of an industry where changes are 
observable in a relatively short time span (Fine, 1998). This point is a matter of interest in 
itself and makes the case intriguing for analyzing industrial and organizational change. For 
this reason we believe our sampling choice seizes, as good single-case research does, the 
“opportunities to explore a significant phenomenon under rare or extreme circumstances” 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p. 27).  
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sample also addressed the research question from both Fiat and supplier 
sides. This is a distinctive characteristic of the present study.  
Between 1997 and 2008, we carried out 77 interviews with managers 
and engineers belonging to 18 different companies, totaling about 145 hours 
(see the appendix). All interviews were taped and transcribed. Particularly 
important for the purposes of this paper is the data gathering campaign of 
2006-2008.  
Our inferences from the case were drawn in a complex triangulation 
process that involved longitudinal and cross sectional comparisons. We 
observed the same unit of analysis, the development process of a new 
vehicle, from the angle of the car maker, its research centers and its 
suppliers, and we saw them evolve over a considerable period of time, 
during which several reorganizations occurred. The level of granularity at 
which we observed was that of the car model development project. This 
perspective fits well with the nature of the research questions.  
Interviewees were chosen according to the relevance of their roles in 
Fiat’s innovation process and its first-tier suppliers. We deliberately 
involved people in charge of strategic decisions as well as personnel with 
more operative roles. In this way, we combined the perspectives of top 
management with micro-level details about the execution of the NPD 
process provided by people involved in the execution of the NPD process. 
To quote just a few, at Fiat we interviewed the Chief Technology Officer, 
the Senior Vice President of Human Resources, the Vice President of 
Product Portfolio Management (all three were members of Fiat’s top-level 
steering committee), the Director of Vehicle Concept & Integration, four of 
the five vehicle line executives (i.e. the engineers responsible for the 
development of cars in each segment), and the staff functions of the Design 
and Engineering division. We thus covered most of the top managers 
leading the product development process. This set of interviews provided us 
with a comprehensive picture of Fiat’s perspective. Regarding the suppliers 
involved in the study, we interviewed ‘account managers’ (responsible for 
the commercial relationship with Fiat from the pre-offer phase until the end 
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of the project) and ‘project managers’ (responsible for component or system 
development). In some cases we also interviewed the supplier’s CEO or 
plant managers (for a list of the interviewees see the appendix). The people 
we interviewed at Fiat and at the suppliers’ frequently dealt with each other 
on a daily or weekly basis. In these cases, there was a solid possibility for 
data triangulation, strengthening our interpretation. Overall, given the nature 
of the research questions, our investigation greatly benefited from this 
double perspective; much of the information concerning the real 
competences of Fiat and suppliers in performing design and engineering 
tasks, the complexity of system integration tasks, the inter-organizational 
routines of product development, and the overall complexity of organizing 
distributed innovation could not have been gathered had we relied solely on 
either Fiat’s or the suppliers’ point of view.  
Our study is subject to limitations. Our sample could be biased by the 
fact that we only interviewed companies located in one country, and 
belonging to one industry. However, the vast majority of companies in the 
sample are local branches of multinational corporations. Moreover, 
technological heterogeneity counterbalances industry specificity. As shown 
in the appendix, the companies analyzed belong to completely different 
sectors (from pure mechanical engineering to electronics, engineering 
consultancy, and rubber). Exposure to multiple technological domains, 
product development priorities, communities of practice, technical 
complexity, and system, component and module integration characteristics 
during the research process provided a source of learning and contributed to 
conclusions that are well informed and empirically grounded (although they 
can, of course, be considered neither normative nor generally applicable).  
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Outsourcing and competence development 
In the nineties Fiat decided to pursue a strategy based on the 
allocation of a growing responsibility for the design and engineering of sub-
systems to global suppliers. The main motivation that led Fiat to an 
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outsourcing strategy was to reduce the assets invested in R&D facilities and, 
at the same time, to leverage the suppliers’ state of the art knowledge, 
especially on new technologies such as electronics. Following a standard 
product decomposition scheme, the allocation of design tasks along the 
value chain (outsourcing) mirrored the distribution of competences in the 
industry. For example, the development of the occupant safety system (seat 
belts, airbags, steering wheel, etc.) was completely outsourced to 
specialized suppliers and so were the brake system, the suspension system, 
the sealing system, the air conditioning system, the dashboard system, etc. 
The logic that guided Fiat in the outsourcing of design and engineering tasks 
to suppliers was substantially determined by the competences that suppliers 
could offer. In turn, supplier specialization and the overall industry structure 
mirrored the evolution of the product architecture, i.e. the scheme according 
to which the product was decomposed in sub-systems.  
The outsourcing strategy had some important consequences for the 
organization of Fiat’s new product development process (on this point see 
[self-citation]). At the central level (i.e. Fiat’s two major research centers) 
Fiat’s engineers maintained a certain level of involvement in some design 
activities related to the systems that had been outsourced in order to monitor 
their long term developments. At the project level, however, suppliers’ 
engineers replaced Fiat’s engineers in the design and engineering of these 
sub-systems. New product development teams became permanently staffed 
with both Fiat’s and suppliers’ engineers. For every development project 
Fiat applied the same task allocation scheme and staffing procedure, just 
fine-tuning the level of involvement of each component and system supplier 
according to the type of product under development (car segment, car 
novelty, etc.) (on this point see [self-citation]). More specifically, the only 
variables Fiat acted on when starting a new development project were the 
numbers of suppliers bidding for a given system development, the degree of 
design carry over that was permitted, the level of system performance, etc. 
Fiat’s engineers’ role in the NPD process was de-facto confined to the 
management of vehicle development projects. In fact, Fiat carried out the 
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design and engineering of only very few components and systems5. Fiat 
gave up most of component and system development, retaining the 
responsibility for the definition of the product architecture, most assembling 
activities, engine development and little more. The average percentage of 
engineering design carried out by suppliers reached a peak of 85% of the 
value of a vehicle. 
The Director of Vehicle Concept & Integration reported to us in 2006 
that Fiat pretended it could be substantially detached from certain 
component and systems technologies and focus primarily on ‘architectural’ 
know-how. The idea of systems integrator that Fiat applied was coupled 
with the idea of modularity, and sometimes interpreted in the sense that the 
system integrator should have the competence of integrating systems as its 
core competence. Accordingly, Fiat tried to build and maintain architectural 
competence, privileging it over other competences such as knowledge about 
component technologies (as exemplified by the high level of outsourcing). 
To summarize, Fiat focused on system integration as its core competence 
and, at the same time, used product architecture as a guide for outsourcing.  
 This strategy, however, turned out to be problematic in practice. The 
roots of Fiat’s problems are complex and, in many respects, their detailed 
description falls outside the scope of this paper (on this point see [self-
citation]). What is important to note here, is that Fiat’s decision to massively 
outsource design and engineering to suppliers came in a moment in which 
the engineering of some key systems was beginning to involve new 
technologies, often exogenous to the automotive industry. Among these 
technologies, electronics (hardware and software) was by far the most 
relevant in the nineties: its introduction contributed to re-shape most of 
engineering principles in the industry (Maxton and Wormald, 2004).  
 Our interviews confirm that the increasing recourse to electronics 
produced huge consequences both on the nature of design activities and 
                                                 
5 Fiat had retained its competences and responsibilities in setting the vehicle marketing 
concept and the related technological choice. This phase of the NPD process, however, is 
antecedent to the phase we are describing here. 
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their partitioning. The nature of design activities changed as by introducing 
the software component into systems, systems could now adjust to 
feedback. The example of the changes brought by electronics in the design 
and engineering of the engine and the exhaust system can help clarify this 
key point. Before “electronics” and in the early stages of the engine 
electronic control era, the fuel and air intake system, the engine and exhaust 
system were usually designed sequentially. This significantly impacted the 
design and engineering of these systems, in that each component was 
developed by one group of engineers in a sequential fashion. Upon 
introduction of electronic control units (ECUs) and new injection systems, 
oxygen sensors were also introduced to enable feedback-based fuel 
metering. Such sensors collect information about injectors and the 
functioning of the catalytic converter, to be forwarded as feedback to a 
control system that enables the proper fuel metering action after having 
interpreted the information through a software. By introducing both oxygen 
sensors and a software capable of changing the working conditions of the 
hardware, the whole system became more tightly coupled. 
 The diffusion of electronics also generated important consequences in 
terms of task partitioning, a byproduct of the design and engineering skills 
that engineers need to have to develop electronic systems. The carmakers’ 
engineers were forced by the new design logic to dominate the knowledge 
of the whole system and of its components and develop a higher level 
knowledge of how the system works. As seen in the previous example, 
before electronics applications in cars reached a maturity stage, the design 
and engineering of the three-way-catalytic converter could be decoupled 
and easily outsourced to suppliers. The relative component specific 
knowledge necessary to develop the catalytic converter was not particularly 
relevant for the carmaker as the optimization of the system was realized 
“locally”, i.e. for each specific component. After the introduction of 
electronics in the car, this approach was not feasible anymore (interview 
with an industry expert, 2009). 
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The main consequence of the increasing use of electronics in cars thus 
was to make the car a more integral product. As explained above, in the 
product itself technical interdependences between systems and components 
increased, as did the organizational interdependences between the people 
who designed those systems and components. That circumstance reinforced 
the consequences of Fiat’s decision to step up design and engineering 
outsourcing. The main problems Fiat experienced are reflected well in the 
following quote: 
 
“It is naïve to believe you can integrate a system 
without holding an in-depth and detailed knowledge 
of the components that are going to affect the 
performance of the whole car. Managing each system 
performance does not, in fact, automatically result in 
effective system integration. The performance is the 
ultimate objective, not systems. ... We realized you 
cannot integrate the performance of components you 
know very little about ... if you have never designed 
a component or a system it will be very difficult to 
understand the subtle interactions with the rest of the 
vehicle. (Director of Vehicle Concept and 
Integration, 2006)”.  
 
One of the crucial insights by the Director of Vehicle Concept and 
Integration was that understanding interactions between systems in the car 
was the key problem. As argued above, such interactions had become more 
important because of the increased integrality (and thus, the increased 
interdependences) of the product. The quote by the Director of Vehicle 
Concept and Integration identifies a specific source of the problem, i.e., a 
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substantial lack of knowledge about the components and systems at the 
project level6.  
Why was that? The Director’s quote puts it to the point by diagnosing 
that it is actually designing a component or system that matters. It indicates 
that it is one thing to have the abstract, underlying knowledge about the 
functioning of a component (for instance, a board computer). It is a different 
thing to provide guidance to the supplier of the board computer in 
integrating it with the other systems in the car during a development project.  
The difference comes to the fore quite clearly when considering the 
new product development project as the unit of analysis and gathering data 
at this level of granularity, as we did. A large part of the task of developing 
a car model consists in carrying out design and engineering of systems and 
components, or if that is outsourced, guiding the suppliers that do it. Fiat 
engineers that were staffed in new product development projects (consider 
that overall there were 3200 people working in parallel on the NPD projects 
in Fiat) had a very vague idea of how to design and engineer the 
components they had to integrate into the vehicle under development 
(including many components designed by suppliers). In the daily interaction 
with suppliers in the development projects, this resulted in a substantial 
hand over of control to suppliers’ engineers. Describing the disadvantage of 
Fiat’s engineers, an engineer at a supplier told us “if you have never 
designed a complex component you will never understand how we do it and 
really control what we do”.  
As the quote by the Fiat Director of Vehicle Concept and Integration 
shows, he seemed to endorse this vision. Moreover, he underlined that the 
introduction of electronics was among the major reasons for a change of the 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that this quote contrasts with the picture we gathered from 
interviews with staff in the R&D centers. In those centers, there were indeed people with in 
depth knowledge about components and systems. Thus, considering Fiat as a whole, it 
would have been correct to say that Fiat had in-house component-specific knowledge, and 
that some form of knowledge overlap between Fiat and its suppliers exited even during the 
period of radical outsourcing. There were indeed skilled engineers with sufficient 
competences to master the whole range of technologies employed in cars and, hence, 
potentially able to guide first tier suppliers. Yet again, we know that the problem persisted 
nonetheless.  
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vehicle’s architecture towards a more integral form. This, in turn, 
contributed to make the knowledge related to each component even more 
relevant for designing the whole system. Fiat’s managers, hence, realized 
that acting as a system integrator without underlying component-specific 
knowledge was just not possible anymore; without such underlying 
component-specific knowledge, systems integration competence was 
difficult to achieve. The problems first materialized as difficulties in 
achieving the desired product performance. These technical problems 
eventually resulted in costly re-design. The re-design process was further 
complicated by the need to coordinate design and engineering efforts with 
suppliers and negotiating the cost implications of re-design. This also 
resulted in longer NPD lead times.  
Most of the product performance problems were usually fixed by the 
time the product was launched on the market. However, the substantial lack 
of system integration competences resulted in poor project performance: the 
cost of re-design and re-engineering products and delays of product 
launches were major reasons why these products had difficulties in breaking 
even. 
4.2 Outsourcing and performance  
Fiat’s experience and its interpretation of that experience allowed us 
to better understand what precisely is at stake when design and engineering 
outsourcing decisions are taken. Fiat was pushing outsourcing far, and in 
order to do so was relying on modularity. Figure 1 plots this relationship. 
The diagonal expresses the ‘constrained’ link, as hypothesized in the 
literature, between product architecture and task allocation: in-sourcing 
would be ‘unnatural’ with a highly modular product architecture, while 
outsourcing would be more difficult in the case of highly integral 
architecture. Interestingly, Fiat’s approach was completely consistent with 
the prescriptions in the literature. 
 
Figure 1 HERE 
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What were the consequences of this approach? As described, in Fiat’s 
case outsourcing of design tasks did not necessarily lead to poor system 
integration. Fiat, in fact, managed to achieve the desired product 
performance in most cases. The products it launched on the market were, in 
fact, eventually successful. However, Fiat’s outsourcing strategy was the 
main cause of poor project performance. While product performance refers 
to the technical performance achieved by the new product, project 
performance refers to the costs and the time required to develop a product 
with certain technical performance characteristics (product performance). 
Our interviewees helped us clarify that technical product performance and 
project performance are very much intertwined in practice. Given that Fiat 
mainly based its NPD process on supplier involvement, most energies were 
devoted to managing the development work of external suppliers. However, 
Fiat’s lack of technical skills on component technologies resulted in fuzzy 
and incomplete specifications to suppliers in early stages of the 
development process. Insufficient specifications often led to costly re-
design that, in turn, resulted in longer lead times and overall poor project 
performance. A very high degree of design outsourcing thus did not alter 
system integration capabilities per se. However, extreme outsourcing led to 
difficulties in obtaining the desired product performance at the expected 
cost, lead times and quality levels, resulting in project performance that did 
not meet expectations. Figure 2 plots the relation of outsourcing and 
performance.  
 
Figure 2 HERE 
 
Figure 2 also helps make a further step ahead in our understanding of 
the Fiat case. Fiat realized that the product architecture was more integral 
than initially thought. As a consequence Fiat resisted attempts to modularize 
it further and eventually reverted its approach. Pursuing a modular strategy 
coupled with a high degree of design outsourcing would, in fact, have 
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required Fiat to make compromises regarding the levels of product and 
project performance.  
Fiat realized it had a performance problem caused – at least to some 
degree – by its extreme outsourcing strategy and its attempt to pursue a 
modular design strategy for a product whose architecture is substantially 
integral7. It had to react.  
4.3 Fiat’s reactions to competence erosion 
4.3.1 The limits of in-sourcing 
Once Fiat recognized and acknowledged it did not have all the 
competences required, in order to remedy this situation, it started hiring 
staff knowledgeable in the areas where it had lost competences, and began 
to emphasize internal development and learning on the new technologies. It 
also intensified personnel rotation between its research centers (CRF and 
Elasis), the Engineering and Design department internal to Fiat and Magneti 
Marelli, a Fiat owned supplier with some expertise in electric and electronic 
systems. It now outsources about 50% of the design and engineering of new 
systems (down from 85%). However, there were some important limitations 
to this reaction to the problem. Fiat’s manager in charge of Systems and 
Vehicle Integration put it succinctly: 
 
“We should have reversed our strategy by integrating 
back competences that we had lost. We had two 
problems, however, no money and no time” 
(Manager in charge of Systems and Vehicle 
Integration, 2006). 
 
                                                 
7 The diagonal in this case represents the optimal frontier given the product architecture 
characteristics. Fiat could not increase its performance without in-sourcing some 
component specific knowledge. MacDuffie’s study (2008) on the limit of modularization in 
the auto industry shows the close relationship between task allocation and performance. In 
particular, MacDuffie observes that ’persistent integrality’ represents a major constraint for 
the choices automotive firms take on boundaries, which is confirmed in our case. 
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Due to insufficient financial and human resources, Fiat’s managers did not 
have the option to completely in-source all the competences that were now 
considered necessary (competences it previously had but that eroded, and 
new ones, such as competencies in electronics). Fiat thus could not move up 
the curve of figure 2 by in-sourcing design and engineering activities. Fiat’s 
management realized they could overcome this constraint if they 
reconsidered the current way of allocating resources to development 
projects, and how tasks were allocated. The next section describes the 
changes that Fiat implemented.  
 
4.3.2 A new outsourcing logic: the template process 
Why was Fiat induced to adopt a new task allocation scheme? And 
what are the distinctive characteristics of its new system? In the previous 
new product development process, Fiat outsourced the same development 
tasks for all its new product development projects. For instance, dashboards 
were always outsourced and Fiat did not design dashboards in-house for any 
of its car models. When Fiat realized it had to in-source competences on key 
components such as suspensions, dashboards, electronics, etc., it did not 
have sufficient engineering resources (people) to staff on each single 
project. In addition, market trends called for a higher number of new 
product introductions. It is at this point that the idea of developing a novel 
NPD process started taking shape.  
With the new process, in fact, Fiat deliberately decided to assume the 
responsibility for designing all key systems in selected projects. In what 
follows we refer to these projects as template projects, to the vehicles 
developed in these projects as template models, and to the novel 
organization of Fiat’s NPD process as template process.  
In the process of developing a template model, Fiat continues to 
involve system suppliers, but is now fully responsible for the engineering 
and the application of all of the most relevant systems in the vehicle. Figure 
3 shows the new outsourcing logic for each development project (the 
number of projects is illustrative). On the left panel, the figure describes 
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how Fiat used to carry out the design and engineering of a limited number 
of components and systems before. This resulted in a situation in which Fiat 
led the development projects of all products under development, but 
designed and engineered only selected types of components and systems, 
the same for each product under development. On the right panel, the figure 
shows that Fiat now fully develops, i.e. designs and engineers, all the most 
important systems of a template model. Derivative product development 
projects can then either be led by Fiat or by engineering suppliers, and the 
detailed design and engineering of components and systems of the 
derivative models can be allocated both to suppliers and to Fiat itself. 
 
Figure 3 HERE 
 
Please note that in Figure 3 we present the extreme case. For 
derivative projects, not just the engineering and design of systems but also 
the complete integration of these systems in the vehicle is outsourced to 
engineering suppliers. The engineering suppliers, rather than component and 
system suppliers, are responsible for integrating functions within the 
vehicle8. Having formulated templates, Fiat realized it was possible to 
outsource the complete development of entire vehicles for derivative 
projects. Our interviews and data indicate that the move towards the new 
logic held the key to economize on the overall amount of resources invested 
in the NPD process and, at the same time, achieve unprecedented 
performance in all NPD projects (see details below).  
Given such a possibility, a set of practical questions arises though. 
What precisely is a template model, and what is the difference between a 
                                                 
8 Engineering suppliers provide engineering services to OEMs according to the car makers’ 
contingent needs. Their contribution ranges from simple CAD calculations to the 
development of turnkey projects, even comprising the design and engineering of entire 
vehicles. The template process leverages the services of engineering suppliers much more 
than in the past, as the typology of vehicles they develop is completely different: no longer 
just niche products with small volumes but rather, mass production models with high 
expected production volumes that have a key position in OEMs’ product portfolio. This 
makes a huge difference in terms of the importance of the project for Fiat’s overall success, 
and the engineering complexity intrinsic to the project. 
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template and a derivative project? What is the difference between a template 
model and a “platform”? How does the role of first-tier suppliers change? 
How does Fiat manage to develop components in-house without major in-
sourcing? How does Fiat decide which component technology is key? What 
is the impact of the template process, i.e. the novel NPD process, on NPD 
performance? 
When compared to the old task allocation scheme, the main 
difference is that for template models, the integration of components and 
systems that affect the product performance Fiat considers key is managed 
completely by Fiat. More specifically, in a template project Fiat develops a 
new car model that, when launched on the market, usually embodies state of 
the art technological solutions (template models, hence, are anything but 
abstract exercises or a form of shadow engineering). Template projects, 
moreover, have the additional goal to develop a bundle of archetypical 
solutions to be leveraged on derivative models. This creates the possibility 
of outsourcing ‘derivative models’. Some examples of design archetypes are 
the architecture of the suspension for small cars, the layout of the panel 
instruments for sports cars, or the design of the sealing system for luxury 
cars. In the occupant safety system, for example, an engineering archetype 
would be the layout and its implications for the interactions between the 
chassis, the bonnet size, the engine, the seats, the airbags, the seat belts, etc. 
for a specific car architecture, e.g. a small car. A template model thus 
consists of a set of archetypical solutions regarding the most important 
components and systems and the way they interact. Such archetypical 
solutions then become standards that characterize products in a given 
market segment9. In other words, during the development of a template 
model, engineers develop engineering solutions that are supposed to be 
reapplied to other models for some time, as long as technology does not call 
for a new archetype. In a metaphorical sense, this set of design archetypes 
defines a model that becomes the ‘ancestor’ which then gives rise to a 
family of variant models (henceforth ‘derivative models’). Following a 
                                                 
9 Of course, these standards are closed standards, i.e., they are specific to Fiat.  
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template means that every time a derivative project is started within a 
segment, engineers will have to apply the template solution from the 
template model (the segment’s ‘ancestor’). This is done either by carrying 
over the same components or, in the case of a physical misfit, by designing 
the new components by scaling the archetypical solution up or down. Please 
note that scalability is a feature that distinguishes templates (archetypical 
solutions) from platforms understood as, for instance, standardized under-
bodies for cars. Nobeoka and Cusumano (1997: 172), for instance, describe 
a car platform as consisting of the floor panels, suspension system, firewall, 
and rocker panels. Of course, by using the template process Fiat also 
pursues the goal of increasing component and system standardization. The 
main systems and components of a template model (what the literature 
would describe as a product platform) are indeed designed to be carried over 
to derivative models. (At the moment of the interviews Fiat was planning to 
go from 19 product platforms in 2006 to 6 in 2012, and from 1.7 models on 
each platform to 3.7. Today, Fiat has a similar plan for Chrysler, to go from 
11 product architectures in 2010 to 7 in 2014 and from 1.9 models per 
platform to 3.0. Overall, the Fiat-Chrysler group plans to have 6-7 platforms 
selling 1 million cars each by 2014). However, the point here is that the 
carry over and carry across of components and systems is not the only or the 
primary objective Fiat is pursuing by adopting the template approach.  
As the next section will outline, templates, as opposed to platforms as 
we know them, serve the scope of providing learning and competence 
development and not just leveraging economies of scale through 
standardization.10  
It is important to note that, for template projects, component and 
system suppliers are still involved in the NPD project. However, Fiat is fully 
responsible for the integration of the components and systems within the 
                                                 
10 In selecting the car model that will become a template models, factors such as profit 
margins per unit do, of course, also matter. As we describe, the predominant criteria in the 
choice of template models that we observed were the characteristics of the model with 
regard to what are the key systems for the performance dimensions that customers value in 
that market segment, and whether new competences needed to be acquired in order to 
design models with high performance in these dimensions.  
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vehicle and has indeed hired engineers that are capable of learning from 
suppliers. In practice, despite the major involvement of Fiat in the 
development of the components and systems, it is here that the relationship 
between Fiat and its first-tier suppliers is close and cooperative. The crucial 
point is that Fiat differentiates between two types of projects. In template 
projects Fiat and its first-tier suppliers work on state of the art solutions for 
long term applications in a truly cooperative fashion. In these projects, 
suppliers are asked to offer innovative design solutions. Some of these 
solutions are developed by the suppliers independently from their 
relationship with Fiat and used as plug-ins for the new generation of Fiat’s 
vehicles, some are co-developed with Fiat’s engineers. In derivative 
projects, on the other hand, Fiat gives more design and engineering 
specifications to its suppliers that, as a consequence, are asked to use Fiat’s 
technical norms and procedures (based on archetypical solutions developed 
in template projects). The level of responsibility of the supplier is high in 
both cases but profoundly different. In template projects, the supplier is not 
fully responsible for its application into the vehicle under development. In 
derivative projects, the supplier is totally responsible for the integration of 
the system into the vehicle during the project but is not asked to offer 
innovative solutions.  
Overall Fiat’s and suppliers’ design and engineering responsibilities 
and division of labor during projects, hence, are substantially different from 
before. In the old outsourcing logic, for each single new project under 
development, the supplier was the only player in the relationship to hold 
specific know-how on the systems, also guided the integration of the system 
into the rest of the vehicle and was responsible for the success of the 
performance of the system in the vehicle (often, beyond the perimeter of the 
components it had designed). With the new outsourcing scheme, for 
template projects Fiat is responsible for achieving the overall product 
performance of the vehicle, including the performance of the specific 
system and its technological contents. Consequently, it is Fiat who deals 
with integrating the system with the rest of the vehicle.  
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Notably, Fiat has set up two completely different relationships with 
suppliers. For templates Fiat develops cooperative innovation plans with 
selected suppliers. The goal is to develop state of the art engineering and 
design solutions to be launched on template models. For derivative projects 
Fiat pushes on the exploitation of existing solutions and has a more arm’s 
length relationship with suppliers11. This approach is consistent with the 
need of having some direct exposure to component development but not 
always or for all projects (due to resource constraints). Fiat’s top 
management decided to focus its efforts on acquiring some knowledge of 
key systems technology. The distinction between template models and 
derivative models is, hence, essential for the new product development 
system based on the template process.12.  
As for the question about what is to be considered a key component or 
system technology, the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) underlined that 
Fiat chose to develop in-house competences for the systems and 
components that directly affected performance in given market segments. 
For example, for the template models designed for the sports cars segment, 
Fiat always develops the suspension system in house as this impacts the 
driving experience of the customer, a key performance for customers in the 
purchasing decisions of sports cars. Fiat does not develop suspensions for 
templates in the small-fuel efficient car segment. This is why Fiat develops 
one template for each market segment. 
Finally, the template process contributed to the increase in NPD 
project performance. A key enabling factor for the viability of the new 
system was the use of virtual simulation techniques (the overall number of 
                                                 
11 Please, note that the same supplier can work on template and derivative projects. From 
interviews with suppliers it emerges that they are well aware of the relational implications 
of being involved in projects that have different purposes. Fiat’s suppliers are used to work 
with Fiat’s organizational systems and procedures that change according to the type of 
involvement. 
12 This distinction should not be mistaken for the usual distinction between research and 
development functions that carry out long term development plans and organizational units 
in charge for new product development projects. This distinction is still valid for Fiat but 
applies to basic R&D, while we focus on applied design and engineering. This is why we 
underlined that both template projects and derivative projects lead to an actual product (not 
a prototype). 
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prototypes for a single new vehicle has dropped from 215 to 24 in the last 
ten years). Once the behavior of a certain system is well known due to 
extensive testing on template products, virtual simulation can be employed 
for derivative projects to enable front loading problem solving and realize 
substantial savings. As far as project performance is concerned, without 
investing additional resources, Fiat managed to speed up its NPD projects 
cutting the lead time of some projects from 26 months to 18 and even 15 
months (these measures consider vehicles of the same segment and are 
calculated on the same NPD projects milestones) (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 HERE 
 
4.3.3 The impact of the template process on competence development 
The most noteworthy aspect of the template process, beyond its 
impact on NPD performance, is that Fiat does not just assume the 
responsibility for designing all key systems of a template model, but also 
does it. Fiat engineers carry out the design and engineering tasks pertaining 
to the integration of all of the important systems of the whole car model 
themselves. This is a key difference from before the adoption of the 
template process. Now, Fiat is aware of the importance that component-
specific knowledge has for systems integration competence. The Chief 
Technology Officer described it in these words: 
“Engineers we staff on template projects hold an 
above-average component-specific know-how [The 
CTO referred to the average in the firm, not the 
industry.] This know-how derives from the fact that 
they themselves develop the key systems. Our 
engineering teams continue to work with suppliers, but 
delegation is not according to black box sourcing as 
before. Learning by doing plays a key role to 
understand the systems we are integrating” (Chief 
Technology Officer, 2007). 
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The template process translates into a product development team that 
develops a new car while managing the integration of all the key systems 
and components design and engineering in-house. This is achieved thanks to 
a renewed ability to work with and learn from suppliers. As the quote above 
shows, Fiat’s engineers are skilled enough to ensure that Fiat maintains its 
absorptive capacity when key systems and components applications are first 
engineered. The template process, hence, provides an instrument for 
developing system integration competences, i.e. a new organizational 
solution for enhancing competence development on product architecture and 
its evolution. This observation links back to the CTO’s quote reported 
above, which emphasizes the central role of the integration of overall 
product performance in system integration. Adding further evidence on this 
point, the CTO described template projects in this way:  
 
“Template projects are a means to learn about key 
technological interdependences and on how to manage 
key performance trade-offs” (Chief Technology 
Officer, 2007). 
 
From a strategic perspective, the fact that the template process allows 
Fiat to dramatically improve its development of system integration 
competence is of paramount importance. What is noteworthy is that the 
template process provides for such competence development without in-
sourcing and thus, without additional investment of financial and 
engineering resources. The key to such competence development is learning 
about interdependences and performance tradeoffs, provided by carrying out 
in-house design and engineering tasks only in template projects.  
Moreover, for Fiat’s derivative projects, the competences 
accumulated by learning about interdependences and performance tradeoffs 
have an important function in improving not just product performance, but 
also increased control over the suppliers responsible for developing systems, 
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components, and derivative models. For example, Fiat has the competence 
of defining better and more detailed specifications of the components and 
systems it purchases, for both template and derivative projects. This 
translates into better chances for mutual learning but also into improved cost 
control during purchasing processes. 
Table 2 provides a synthesis of the overall logic underlying the 
template process. It shows that Fiat’s decisions concerning the allocation of 
innovation tasks have an impact on the following variables: (1) project 
management, i.e. who leads the development projects (in the previous 
section we have seen that the new solution gives a new role to engineering 
suppliers in this respect); (2) task allocation, i.e. who does what in the value 
chain; and (3) the competences of the actors involved, i.e. who knows what 
(and will nurture such knowledge through learning by doing).  
 
Table 2 HERE 
 
4.4 A crucial trade-off and Fiat’s lesson 
Fiat realized it had to in-source some competences, some it previously 
had but that eroded, and some new ones, such as competences in 
electronics. This move is represented in Figure 5 that reports how Fiat’s 
organizational choices impacted on the frontier described in Figure 2. Due 
to some in-sourcing Fiat moved along the diagonal – step 1 represented in 
Figure 5.  Given the limited amount of resources it could employ, however, 
Fiat could not achieve the desired performance, not for all projects. Due to 
severe resource constraints, hence, Fiat could only try to change variables 
other than the level of in-sourcing and, in so doing, move the optimal 
frontier. The performance increase we have documented shows that Fiat 
indeed managed to move the optimal frontier (from X to Y - Step 2 - in 
Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 HERE 
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Moving the frontier meant doing more with less. But how could this 
happen? What are the fundamental changes underlying the new approach? 
Fiat acknowledged that in order to improve the performance of its product 
development without insourcing design activities, it had to adapt its NPD 
organization. Fiat radically changed its interpretation of make or buy 
choices. Before the adoption of the template process, Fiat focused only on 
the scope of design activities, i.e. it decided which competence to maintain 
in house and which to outsource and then replicated the scheme for every 
project. Now, Fiat intervenes on different variables. Product architecture is 
still the scheme by which design and engineering tasks are partitioned. 
However, as seen above, Fiat now allocates tasks according to the type of 
development project, distinguishing between template projects and 
derivative projects. Introducing such a distinction allows applying a 
different task allocation scheme to each project. It also allows alternating 
the task allocation scheme over time, as Fiat alternates template projects 
with derivative projects.  
Why is the segmentation of NPD projects in template and derivative 
projects so important? As seen above, the most important criterion for 
taking boundary decisions is where Fiat needs to engage in learning by 
doing to develop the system integration capabilities important for achieving 
the performance that customers consider essential in a given market 
segment. Because Fiat has got few skilled engineers and limited financial 
resources, it cannot engage in direct involvement of its engineers in actual 
development work to activate this learning process for every model it 
develops. In other words, Fiat cannot expand the segments of the value 
chain it is active in on a permanent basis for all its projects. Fiat’s solution 
for extending the benefits of learning by doing to every project is to 
introduce different task allocation schemes for template and derivative 
projects, and then alternating over time between these different task 
allocation schemes. Fiat’s engineers first engage in all the key design and 
engineering activities on a template project with the explicit goal of learning 
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about the key product interdependencies of a given product family working 
closely with first tier suppliers (e.g. for a template model of an A-segment 
car). Subsequently, they leverage such knowledge by fully outsourcing the 
application of derivative components and systems in one or more derivative 
projects (e.g. all the models belonging to the A-segment developed 
afterwards). In designing its boundary, Fiat therefore now also considers an 
additional design parameter, i.e., the possibility of alternating over time 
between different project responsibilities and task allocation schemes for 
different kinds of development projects. As shown above, Fiat managed to 
deal with the same suppliers according to at least two different rationales: 
(1) learning from (and with) system suppliers for template projects; (2) 
leveraging engineering suppliers for derivative projects (for these projects 
system suppliers deal with engineering suppliers and provide standard-off-
the shelf solutions directly drawing from template projects). Figure 6 
synthesizes the variables that are central for the new organization of Fiat’s 
product development process. 
 
Figure 6 HERE 
 
Figure 6 captures (1) how Fiat distinguishes between two types of 
development projects, (2) how each type of development project is linked to 
a different task allocation scheme, and (3) how Fiat alternates between two 
types of projects over time, thus translating into an alternation of task 
allocation schemes over time. Because each of the two task allocation 
schemes yields a different benefit, either competence development from 
learning by doing or economies of scale, such alternation of the two task 
allocation schemes allows Fiat to move the frontier of the trade-off between 
outsourcing and project performance. The template process is thus an 
instrument for improving product and project performance without vertical 
integration (i.e. in-sourcing design tasks) or changing product architecture 
(i.e. pushing towards a more modular approach). As our empirical evidence 
highlights the template process allows Fiat to realize benefits regarding 
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absorptive capacity (acquiring component-specific knowledge), building up 
architectural knowledge (in part by acquiring component-specific 
knowledge), and supplier governance - but without losing the benefits of 
knowledge specialization and drawing on external sources of innovation as 
in the old system where developing certain parts of the product architecture 
were always allocated to suppliers. Moreover, as figure 6 shows, the 
template also fulfils another purpose, one that Fiat did not manage to attain 
under the old system: to shape competence development paths by being in 
full control of what the company’s engineers learn in development projects. 
As seen, this control was exercised selectively and dynamically. For 
instance, Fiat can now decide to direct its competence development path to 
the field of electronics and how electronics competences need to be 
integrated with the old mechanical competences in development projects. 
For the next generation of templates, Fiat is in the position of focussing on 
integrating hybrid power train technologies, for instance.  
These examples show that the template system approach can also 
provide Fiat with a way to achieve a balance between exploration (learning 
about new solutions, upper part of the figure) and exploitation (leveraging 
economies of scale, lower part of the figure). The template system provides 
a way of enabling organizational ambidexterity (Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996) that is different from the forms in which either ‘contextual’ or 
‘structural’ ambidexterity (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004) have been 
implemented. It is based on alternating between different project types that 
are linked to different task allocation schemes.  
 
4.5 Difficulties, drawbacks, and limits of implementing the template 
process 
Of course, as with any organizational solution the template process 
has drawbacks, difficulties and limits. As the Chief Technology Officer 
observed, the availability of engineering suppliers with sufficient 
competences to fully develop derivative projects represents a limit to the 
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feasibility of this approach. The strength of this limit will depend on issues 
such as the reaction of suppliers to opportunities of offering larger bundles 
of design and engineering services, the speed with which they can build up 
additional competences required in order to do so successfully, the 
incentives and pressure OEMs can build for suppliers to offer such services, 
the industry structure, etc. A second practical difficulty pertains to problems 
with protecting intellectual property when the template, i.e., the set of 
engineering archetypes, is handed over to a supplier. One of the key 
motivations for creating templates is to convey the archetypical engineering 
solutions to those who develop derivative models in a concise and precise 
way. This also fuels the risk of imitation. The power of the template process 
approach will be limited by how the problem of allowing replication (by 
parties that are supposed to develop derivative models) can be dealt while 
avoiding imitation (by parties that are not supposed to) can be dealt with 
(Szulanski, 1999; Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Szulanski and Winter, 2002). 
A third practical problem is that having mastered the generation of 
templates, replicating them reliably is not trivial either (Rivkin, 2001; 
Szulanski and Jensen, 2006). Amongst others, it poses the challenge of 
developing new competences for replicating the template and of adapting 
the organization for this purpose.13 Such competences go beyond 
competences relating to creating and replicating templates. Because the new 
system is quite radically different, these differences also apply to supplier 
relations. We have highlighted how the turnkey engineering supplier has 
much larger responsibility and is required to adapt its competences. In 
addition, there are new problems that both Fiat and suppliers have to deal 
with (such as protecting the intellectual property of Fiat). Finally, a potential 
practical problem might arise from the fact that by shifting to a template 
process system, one ‘freezes’ technical solutions for a particular period. The 
time steps in which technical solutions are adapted are thus longer. In 
                                                 
13 Remember that in the previous organization, product architecture and task allocation 
were considered tightly linked. Because of the predominantly technical nature of decisions 
on product architecture, the people and organization units that made task allocation 
decisions therefore were very much focused on technical matters. 
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principle, this could lead to making the template process approach 
unfeasible for technologies that change very fast (faster than the time steps 
for which an archetypical solution will be held in place). The learning 
advantages of the template process can potentially generate a new trade-off 
with the pace of introduction of new archetypical solutions14.  
 
5. Discussion 
We started our paper by pointing to a fundamental trade-off between 
the benefits of leveraging external sources of specialized knowledge vs. the 
benefits of developing new internal competences in component design and 
engineering.  Our findings do not only confirm the existence of the trade-off 
and identify its roots; they also highlight a solution for seizing learning 
opportunities on new technologies despite outsourcing and for maintaining 
state of the art system-integration competences over time. 
The case shows that before adopting the template process, Fiat 
followed the scheme determined by the product architecture in allocating 
design tasks. This allocation was based on choices previously taken in the 
centralized R&D functions which decided the most appropriate product 
architectures. The resulting decomposition scheme was subsequently held 
constant for as many development projects as possible and so was the 
choice concerning the systems that had to be outsourced. The staffing of 
NPD projects with internal engineers or suppliers’ engineers followed as a 
direct consequence of these choices. Note that the root of the problems Fiat 
encountered was not the underlying logic of project staffing itself but rather 
the fact that it was coupled with the outsourcing of a vast amount of design 
and engineering activities to suppliers for all of Fiat’s projects. This 
produced the consequence that Fiat’s engineers systematically missed 
learning opportunities about a great number of key systems of the cars. This 
                                                 
14 Please note that this trade-off is a consequence of the need of amortizing the investments 
in developing systems and components for template models by carrying them over to 
derivative models. With the template process, Fiat is coping with a learning trap 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). Still, there is ‘no free lunch’. In fact, in order to be able to 
seize the scale advantages of the template system, Fiat has to accept the use of a high 
percentage of carry-over components in most of its products. 
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resulted in a substantial hollowing out of the company’s competences 
related not only to the systems that were outsourced but also to the 
competence of integrating these systems with the rest of the vehicle. The 
problem was further aggravated by the fact that the outsourcing strategy was 
pursued in a period of technological change (in the nineties, the introduction 
of electronics was changing the way most systems were designed and 
integrated into cars).  
 As Fiat lost the competences to design the systems it outsourced, the 
boundaries of its knowledge soon had shrunk to the boundaries of the 
activities it carried out. Only after having experienced the partial failures of 
knowledge integration mechanisms (such as joint teams with suppliers and 
their physical co-location at its NPD locations), Fiat realized the negative 
consequences of its task allocation logic on competence development and 
the importance of having its own engineers directly involved in design and 
engineering activities15. When Fiat decided to re-gain control of its projects 
by integrating back in some engineering and design activities, it also 
realized it had to forego some of the benefits of leveraging the know-how of 
suppliers’ engineers and suppliers’ R&D investments which had played 
such a key role for lowering Fiat’s own investments in R&D.  Thus, Fiat 
was up against the trade-off. 
With sufficient resources, Fiat would most likely have internalized 
engineering and design activities as the negative consequences of extreme 
outsourcing became evident. We thus would not have had the empirical 
occasion to observe a new way of managing the trade-off. There is no 
doubt, in fact, that Fiat came up with the organizational innovation we 
documented as a typical instance of what Bolton (1993) would define a case 
in which “necessity is the mother of innovation”: for reaping the benefits of 
                                                 
15 This finding contributes to the literature on buyer-supplier relationships in NPD showing 
that knowledge integration mechanisms such as co-location and inter-firm joint teams (see 
on the role of these solutions Helper, 1991, Lamming 1993, Smitka, 1991, Nishiguchi, 
1994, Helper & Sako, 1995, Helper et al. 2000, Sako, 2004) need to be complemented by 
knowledge building mechanism such as learning by doing. In this respect, our findings 
point to the importance of learning by doing for benefitting from external knowledge, 
confirming Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) conclusion. 
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learning by doing in a situation in which it could not increase its internal 
staff, Fiat had to find another solution. It adopted a new organizational 
solution. At the heart of this organizational solution lies a new logic of 
project staffing and resource allocation, i.e., the principle of alternating over 
time between different task allocation schemes, which are linked to different 
projects (template and derivative projects). This move provided Fiat with a 
means to systematically utilize the insight that in order to learn one has to 
do, but not always. The empirical evidence shows that this solution 
contributed to boost Fiat’s NPD performance while still maintaining a high 
level of engineering outsourcing. Overall, the adoption of the template 
process strongly mitigated the trade-off.  
It is noteworthy that in the solution that Fiat found, the allocation of 
design and engineering tasks does not mirror the scheme by which the 
product is decomposed (i.e. the product architecture) anymore (and not for 
all projects). This finding is striking in many respects, especially if one 
considers the central role that product architecture has played in the 
innovation management literature (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). In what 
follows, we discuss this empirical evidence in the light of current literature 
focusing respectively on the drivers of competence development in NPD 
projects, the role of product architecture in organizing NPD activities and 
the implications of our findings for designing firms’ boundaries.  
 
5.1 The role of learning by doing in competence development processes 
Two main insights of our study concern the main drivers of 
competence development in NPD projects and how firms can build new 
internal competences. In our interviews at Fiat and its suppliers, 
interviewees that were actively involved in development projects were 
unanimous in pointing to the key role played by learning by doing in 
accumulating component specific knowledge. Figure 6 has captured how the 
template process is an instrument for leveraging both the advantages of 
learning by doing and of economies of scale. In the context of the 
innovation literature, focused on the questions how firms can design a 
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setting (comprising product and organization architecture) that is conducive 
to successful product innovation, our findings also support the idea that 
component-specific knowledge is a prerequisite for accumulating and 
maintaining architectural knowledge, and thus for being able to draw on 
external sources of innovation without losing control of product and project 
performance (Takeishi, 2001, 2002). Our findings therefore suggest that 
system integrators must be seriously involved in some form of “doing” in 
order to “learn”. Firms, thus, do not always manage to “know more than 
they make”. At least in circumstances such as those described here, there is 
no learning without doing. These points cast light on why firms often 
experience so many problems in integrating external sources of innovation.  
Our data further underlines that the competences held by Fiat at the 
firm level (e.g. in its centralized R&D structures), did not necessarily turn 
into actual product development competences at the project level. The 
reason we were explicitly given (see section 4.1) was that much of the 
knowledge needed at the project level is tacit and very specific (this reflects 
prior research, such as Kogut & Zander, 1992). NPD performance, in fact, is 
generated at the project level and it is here that the system integrator must 
be able to mobilize its integration competences. When Fiat’s engineers were 
asked to coordinate suppliers’ design and engineering activities, they lacked 
this kind of tacit knowledge, with negative performance consequences. On 
the other hand, after adopting the template process, Fiat’s engineers deal 
with suppliers in a novel way although Fiat still relies on outsourcing and 
still uses co-location and inter-firm product development teams with 
suppliers. The key is that thanks to the activation of learning by doing Fiat’s 
engineers hold enough technical know-how, including competences with an 
important tacit component, to fully benefit from, and evaluate and control 
suppliers’ technical contributions – and thus to leverage the advantages of 
outsourcing.  
 
5.2 The role of product architecture in organizing NPD activities 
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The case has shown that problems in integrating external sources of 
innovation are not primarily related to reaching a particular product 
performance. The hardest problem in complex product development, in fact, 
is to deal with both product and project performance at the same time. The 
reason is that they are reciprocally interdependent – sub-optimal product 
performance has negative consequences on project performance (for 
instance, inducing the need of design changes), and sub-optimal project 
management and performance also have negative consequences on product 
performance (for instance, lower overall vehicle performance due to 
problems of coordinating the systems integration process). This is precisely 
the process that led Fiat to lose control of project performance in its 
development projects. 
Our empirical findings show that the template process contributed to 
boosting Fiat’s NPD performance, including increasing project 
performance. De-coupling decisions about product architecture and task 
allocation decisions was crucial for being able to do that. The first reason is 
that it allowed taking the task allocation decision by criteria other than 
technical criteria. The second reason, however, is that task allocation rather 
than product architecture becomes the main focus of design efforts. The 
template process is an instrument for alternating between different task 
allocation schemes. This bears important implications for the role of product 
architecture in the product development process and for innovation 
management.  In order to fully elucidate the benefits of such decoupling it is 
necessary to recall that while the optimal product architecture is normally 
chosen to maximize product performance according to the current 
dominating technological paradigm, one important impact of task allocation 
decisions is on the development of component specific and architectural 
knowledge. Choices concerning product architecture and task allocation 
are profoundly different, even though they are often taken in a strictly 
intertwined way. Even in the presence of an optimal product architecture 
design, hence, firms can still experience poor system integration 
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performance, especially in the long run, if the effects of task allocation on 
competence development are not taken into account.  
Building on and expanding previous literature (Brusoni et al., 2001; 
Takeishi, 2001, 2002; Hoetker, 2006), our empirical evidence thus 
contradicts the so called ‘mirroring hypothesis’, i.e., that the structure of a 
product development organization must necessarily ‘mirror’ the architecture 
of the product it develops (Colfer, 2007). This is because Fiat changed its 
task allocation scheme considerably even with an unchanged product 
architecture. Not only does the example show that doing so is possible. 
When Fiat’s organization stopped mirroring the product architecture and 
was designed according to the impact of learning by doing on competence 
development processes (after adopting the template process), Fiat also 
experienced substantial performance benefits16.    
 
5.3 Consequences for organizational boundary choices  
  The findings we presented in the previous two sections bear important 
implications for organizational boundary design. Extant literature provides 
the following advice for organizational boundaries choices: outsource where 
the production plus transaction cost of the outsourced solution is lower than 
organizing the transaction inside the firm (Williamson, 1985) and when 
leveraging external sources of innovation provides significant gains in new 
product development efficiency (Clark, 1989). This efficiency based 
rationale is reinforced by the assumption that the scope of knowledge has 
some degree of independence with regard to what firms make (i.e. the 
design and engineering tasks a firm actually carries out) (Brusoni et al., 
2001). This view is further supported by studies that point to the possibility 
of learning before doing (Pisano, 1996) or of embarking in collaborations 
                                                 
16 This finding also adds to existing literature that confronts modular organizations 
(Sturgeon, 2002) with integrated or re-integrated organizations (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 
2005; Fixson & Park, 2008) showing that some of the trade-off that this literature highlights 
might need to be revisited. Take, for example, the idea that integral organizational forms 
provide richer communication opportunities (including coordination by mutual adjustment), 
while more modular ones allow parallel development and diminish the need for 
coordination. Usually, those two forms are juxtaposed. The process we document was 
designed to leverage the benefits from both organizational forms. 
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with suppliers instead of investing in component specific knowledge 
directly (Helper et al., 2000). Firms, in fact, usually outsource design and 
engineering activities under the assumption that there are alternative forms 
of learning to learning by doing. Fiat also made that assumption before it 
realized that the efficiency criterion decoupled from an explicit focus on 
competence development processes was putting its own survival at risk. An 
important assumption did not hold, at least not under the conditions present 
in the case: that the learning processes of Fiat’s engineers and their ability to 
interact with suppliers’ could be fostered by off-line learning (as the one 
carried out in R&D centers) or by interacting with suppliers’ knowledgeable 
engineers. The reason is that what you do and what you know are quite 
closely related.  
 It is worth noting that the variables that subsequently drove Fiat’s new 
choices concerning its boundaries in development projects were neither the 
core variables of TCE (i.e., asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty), nor 
other related efficiency considerations. At least, these latter did not appear 
to be the most important. Rather, competence development through learning 
by doing, and the variables that decided on that, had a huge effect on task 
allocation between Fiat and its suppliers. This is not to say that the TCE 
logic would not matter for understanding task allocation between Fiat and 
its suppliers. Rather the data supports the idea that the TCE considerations 
need to be complemented and combined with competence considerations, an 
idea raised in prior literature (Langlois, 1992; Teece and Pisano, 1994). 
Pointing to learning and competence development as variables that matter 
for determining firm boundaries is also consistent with Brusoni and 
Prencipe’s (2006: 179) finding that ‘knowledge evolution mediates 
organizational and technological change’ and with Jacobides and Winter’s 
(2005) observation of a dynamic link between transaction costs and 
competence development processes: changes in vertical scope affect 
competence development processes and transaction costs, with the latter two 
in turn influencing vertical scope decisions. Indeed, in our case, competence 
development patterns were so important that they alone forced Fiat to 
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embark in re-organizing its new product development activities, leading to a 
new boundary design. This lends support to the idea of Brusoni and 
Prencipe (2006), Jacobides and Winter (2005) and earlier authors that 
competences have an effect on vertical scope.  
 Our evidence also provides a stepping-stone for complementing this 
idea. While Jacobides and Winter (2005) point out that changes in scope 
affect the capability development process, we specify additional 
organizational design measures that can affect the capability development 
process. Such organizational design measures can be a key determinant of 
competence development processes and transaction costs differentials, even 
for a given degree of vertical scope. The Fiat case thus shows how firms can 
systematically seize learning opportunities and nurture competence 
development processes also through changes in organization design (and 
without changing vertical integration), rather than by shifting the boundary 
of the firm by vertical integration or disintegration. We therefore contend 
that firms can make use of alternating task allocation schemes over time as 
an alternative to adapting vertical scope, at least to a certain extent. It is an 
interesting question for further research under which circumstances the 
effects of adapting organizational design with unchanged vertical scope will 
be more important than those of changing vertical scope without using the 
possibilities from alternative task allocation schemes over time.  
 In this respect, our findings join a recent turn in boundary design 
research that contributes to a notion of firm boundaries which complements 
that of vertical scope. According to this perspective, firms have further 
options for boundary design than just adjusting vertical scope, such as 
‘make and buy’, ‘taper integration’ (Harrigan, 1984), ‘plural governance’ 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Heide, 2003), the ‘simultaneous pursuit of 
vertical integration and strategic outsourcing’ (Rothaermel et al., 2006), 
‘concurrent sourcing’ (Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009), and 
‘permeable vertical architectures’ (Jacobides & Billinger, 2006).  
 Our data identify an option for boundary design that goes beyond the 
options of boundary design identified in those articles, however. First, it is 
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situated in a more complex setting. While Parmigiani (2007: 287), for 
instance, focuses on concurrent sourcing as a ‘simple and clean hybrid 
sourcing mode, involving a single firm and a single good’, product 
development in the automotive industry is characterized by the involvement 
of multiple (tiers of) suppliers in a development task. Second and most 
importantly, the mechanism behind the template process is very different 
from the mechanisms identified previously. For instance, permeable 
boundaries allow to sell and acquire intermediate goods (Jacobides & 
Billinger, 2006). The principle underlying concurrent sourcing is to make a 
proportion of the overall volume in-house and outsource a proportion 
(Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). The mechanism the template process draws 
on is to alternate over time between different task allocation schemes for 
different types of projects. As we documented, unlike in the case of 
concurrent sourcing in manufacturing documented by Parmigiani and 
Mitchell (2009), in the case of new product development, partial 
outsourcing can be implemented in the sense of always outsourcing the 
design and engineering of some systems – rather than sometimes 
outsourcing systems design and engineering. As it turns out, in the product 
development context, this difference matters because in the case the 
development of complex products (as opposed to the case of manufacturing) 
the integration of components and systems is a crucial challenge. But for 
integrating, one needs to span all important systems – the exact opposite of 
the principle of ‘partial integration’. Learning by doing regarding 
integration is essential, and such learning takes place when in template 
projects, Fiat integrates all these systems itself. The point is precisely that 
alternating between different task allocation schemes provides a way of 
carrying out some development tasks in-house and outsourcing in a way 
that, however, preserves possibilities for learning by doing about integrating 
the whole system. (This is also why one would actually overlook the central 
mechanism of the template process if one simply calculated an average 
degree of outsourcing for a particular period of time.)   
 Our finding also means that if you add an organizational mechanism 
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that permits alternating between different task allocation schemes, the 
boundaries of the firm’s knowledge and competences change in a way that 
avoid drifting apart of the knowledge and task boundaries (mainly by 
avoiding that internal competences on new technologies are not developed). 
Note that this result is achieved without adapting vertical scope, i.e., by 
hiring a huge engineering staff, in order to have the competences of the new 
technologies. Because that problem is documented also in other complex 
products such as airplanes (Argyres, 1999) and aircraft engines (Brusoni et 
al, 2001), our findings appear to go beyond the automobile industry and 
extend to complex products more generally.   
 A corollary of our findings is the indication that conceiving of firm 
boundaries mainly in terms of vertical scope, i.e. as a continuum between 
‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’, has limited traction in accommodating all design 
variables and dimensions of firm boundaries that matter and that firms 
employ today. The boundary phenomena documented by some of the 
authors cited above, for instance, do not seem to be captured well if 
described as a mix of market and hierarchy. Extending the notion of 
‘hybrids’ does not seem to be able to do that either. No ‘mixture’ of the two 
elements of market and hierarchy will be able to fully capture phenomena 
such as the template process we have described. There is no doubt, in fact, 
that such a focus and its epistemological implications would have made it 
impossible to detect the important change in Fiat’s boundary design and the 
role played by organizational levers – and thus, to identify the 
organizational arrangement that led to considerable benefits.  
 Finally, we also add to MacDuffie’s (2008: 41) insight that firms 
developing complex products such as cars should ‘develop the capability to 
experiment and move activities back and forth across organizational 
boundaries’. We show that firms cannot only experiment by outsourcing 
activities and acquiring them back to carry out in-house. They can also try 
and experiment with alternative solutions, mostly based on organizational 
settings that leave vertical scope unchanged. These latter settings, as the 
case of Fiat shows, belong to a rather different set of viable solutions and in 
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this sense, open new possibilities. And the ‘capability to experiment’ related 
to those is of a totally different nature. 
 
5.4 Limitations 
Our conclusions are subject to limitations and boundary conditions. 
The domains to which our conclusions apply are limited to the domain of 
complex products, especially when they embody heterogeneous 
technologies. In such products, the tension between having to draw on 
outside sources of innovation and the drawbacks of doing so is much more 
pronounced. Understanding the limitations of the applicability of our 
findings, however, also allows the potential of the insights to emerge; within 
the limitations identified, there seem to be many domains where the system 
we have described has not yet been applied but could potentially be, with 
powerful positive consequences. In the next and concluding section we 
summarize our main arguments and point to new possibilities, both for firms 
that develop complex products and for scholars of innovation management, 
organization and strategy.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have addressed the question how firms that develop 
complex products can benefit from drawing on external sources of 
innovation without losing key learning opportunities, system integration 
capabilities and, together with them, control of product and project 
performance. The firm we analyzed confronted that question in a moment 
where it also had to acquire new competences in electronics, which changed 
the product architecture and the interdependences of development tasks. The 
case study presented here provided the occasion to contrast two ways of 
approaching the key choice concerning how to decide on the division of 
labor of innovation tasks within and across firms’ boundaries, i.e., task 
allocation. Our empirical evidence adds further support to the literature that 
has pointed out the dangers of design outsourcing (Lincoln et al., 1998; 
Fine, 1998), and the centrality of performance integration as a criterion for 
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which component-specific knowledge should be maintained in-house 
(Takeishi, 2001, 2002). In this respect, in organizing NPD, we highlight that 
managers should focus on task allocation and its consequences on the 
competences of the firm. When thinking about the boundary of the firm and 
how to manage it, what sticks out as very important is the allocation of who 
really is involved in doing what at the project level, division of labor in a 
basic and straightforward sense. This division of labor becomes problematic 
when task allocation is carried out according to the product architecture 
scheme despite the fact that the product under development is not fully 
modular. In this circumstance, specific efforts of organizing development 
can make the difference for developing complex products so that high 
product performance is achieved without major drawbacks. Changing 
vertical scope is not necessarily required.  
The Fiat case supports the idea that vertical scope is an important 
determinant of competence development processes (Argyres, 1999; Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Teece, 2007), but it goes 
beyond this insight by showing that vertical scope itself is not the only or 
most prevalent determinant of competence development. We show that at 
least two additional variables matter: (1) the rationale for involving 
suppliers in the NPD process and (2) how firms organize what they make. 
The first point is exemplified by the difference between buying a 
component or a system vs. buying an opportunity to learn from (and with) 
suppliers about that component or system. The second is exemplified by the 
possibility enhanced by a purely organizational measure – the template 
process – to seize learning opportunities despite major outsourcing. Both 
variables generate effects independently of vertical scope. 
This evidence contributes to reflecting on the available strategies that 
firms can pursue in order to benefit from innovation in the case of design 
and engineering outsourcing. On a more general level, our findings show 
that in order to conceptually capture the solutions that contribute to mitigate 
the tradeoff between the benefits of leveraging on external sources of 
innovation and the risk related to this strategy, theories on the link between 
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vertical scope and competence development benefit from bringing the role 
of organizing back into the picture. For instance, discussing knowledge and 
knowledge differentials between OEMs and suppliers yields more insight 
when also considering the organization structures (such as projects) in 
which such knowledge is actually applied. 
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TABLES, FIGURES & APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1 – Benefits of allocating design tasks within or beyond the firm’s 
boundaries  
 Organizational option 
 Allocate design tasks to suppliers  Carry out design tasks in-house 
Related 
benefits 
Benefits of knowledge specialization:  
• OEM	  specialization	  in	  architectural	  
knowledge	  and	  integrating	  
components	  and	  modules	  
• Supplier	  specialization	  in	  component-­‐
specific	  knowledge	  
	  
Benefits	  of	  modular	  design:	  
• facilitates	  allocating	  the	  development	  
of	  modules	  to	  suppliers	  
• facilitates	  drawing	  on	  outside	  sources	  
of	  innovation	  
 
Benefits of learning opportunities: 
• learning	  by	  doing	  regarding	  component-­‐
specific	  knowledge,	  thus	  nurturing	  
component-­‐specific	  knowledge:	  	  
o increases	  firms’	  absorptive	  capacity	  
regarding	  new	  technological	  
developments	  
o fosters	  development	  of	  architectural	  
knowledge	  
o decreases	  differences	  to	  component-­‐
specific	  knowledge	  of	  suppliers	  	  
o diminishes	  risks	  of	  problems	  in	  
supplier	  governance	  
	  
• prevents	  loss	  of	  control	  of	  product	  and	  
project	  performance	  by	  enabling	  
o taking	  decisions	  on	  interdependencies	  
o adapting	  decomposition	  schemes	  
o adapting	  to	  technological	  newness	  
o dealing	  with	  uneven	  rates	  of	  
technological	  development	  and	  
unpredictable	  interdependencies 
 
 
 
 58 
Table 2 – A synthesis of the new approach 
 
 
  Before Now 
Project scope Same	  for	  all	  products	   Different	  for	  ‘template	  models’	  and	  
‘derivative	  models’	  
Allocation of 
design and 
engineering tasks 
OEM	  for	  25%-­‐30%	  of	  
components/systems	  
Suppliers	  for	  the	  rest	  
Mainly	  OEM	  for	  ‘template	  projects’	  
Mainly	  suppliers	  for	  derivative	  projects	  
Technological 
competences 
OEM	  holds	  competences	  on	  selected	  
technologies	  and	  outsources	  the	  
remaining	  
	  
OEM	  controls	  the	  competences	  to	  
manage	  performance	  trade	  offs	  	  
Suppliers	  hold	  component	  specific	  
technologies	  
	  	  
Key 
variables 
Project 
management / 
control through 
hierarchy 
OEM	  
OEM	  for	  ‘template	  projects’	  
	  
OEM,	  Fiat’s	  off-­‐shore	  development	  
and	  engineering	  centres,	  Engineering	  
Suppliers	  for	  ‘template	  projects’	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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Product architecture and task allocation 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 2 – Task allocation and performance 
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Figure 3 - Old and new outsourcing logic 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – The impact of the template process on lead times  
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Figure 5 – A new viable frontier  
 
 
 
Figure 6 – A synthesis of the implications of the template process 
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Appendix A: companies involved in the study and interviews 
 
Company	   Product	   Date	  
Interview	  
length	  in	  
hours	  
Role	  of	  person	  interviewed	  
Fiat	   Auto	   25/05/1998	   2	   Purchasing	  director	  Segment	  C	  
Fiat	   Auto	   27/04/1998	   3	   New	  Product	  Development	  Methodologies	  Manager	  
Fiat	   Auto	   28/07/1999	   1	   Global	  Sourcing	  Director	  
Fiat	   Auto	   28/07/1999	   2	   Component	  Development	  Platform	  Manager	  
Fiat	   Auto	   28/07/1999	   1	   Global	  Sourcing	  and	  Purchasing	  Policy	  Manager	  
Fiat	   Auto	   15/09/2001	   2	   Purchasing	  responsible	  for	  new	  product	  development	  
Fiat	   Auto	   1/03/2001	   2	   Purchasing	  Director	  
Fiat	   Auto	   1/03/2001	   2	   New	  product	  development	  	  Director	  
Fiat	   Auto	   2/03/2001	   1	   Global	  sourcing	  director	  
Fiat	   Auto	   2/03/2001	   1	   Product	  Planning	  Manager	  
Fiat	   Auto	   06/2001	   1	   Racing	  division	  Manager	  
Fiat	   Auto	   07/2002	   2	   Vehicle	  line	  executive	  segment	  A-­‐B	  
Fiat	  Research	  
Centre	  (1)	  
R&D	  Auto	   22/3/2006	   1	   CEO	  of	  Fiat’s	  research	  center	  
Fiat	  Research	  
Centre	  (1)	  
R&D	  Auto	   8/02/2006	   2	  
Business	  Development	  Director	  Technologies	  Division	  of	  Fiat’s	  
research	  center	  	  
Fiat	  	   Auto	   8/02/2006	   1	   VP	  Investor	  relations	  
Fiat	   Auto	   23/06/2006	   2	   VP	  Product	  Portfolio	  Management	  
Fiat	   Auto	   23/06/2006	   1	   VP	  Human	  Resources	  
Fiat	   Auto	   23/06/2006	   1	   Business	  Development	  Manager	  
Fiat	   Auto	   23/06/2006	   1	   Manufacturing	  Director	  	  
Fiat	   Auto	   14/07/2006	   1	   Director	  of	  Vehicle	  Concept	  and	  Integration	  
Fiat	   Auto	   14/07/2006	   1	   Director	  Design	  Center	  
Fiat	   Auto	   14/07/2006	   1	   VP	  Design	  &	  Engineering	  (CTO)	  
Fiat	   Auto	   14/07/2006	   1	   Vehicle	  line	  executive	  segment	  A-­‐B	  
Fiat	   Auto	   14/07/2006	   1	   Vehicle	  line	  executive	  segment	  C,	  
Fiat	   Auto	   09/05/2006	   1	   Vehicle	  line	  executive	  segment	  C,	  
Fiat	   Auto	   14/07/2006	   1	   Vehicle	  line	  executive	  segment	  D-­‐E	  
Fiat	   Auto	   14/07/2006	   1	   Vehicle	  line	  executive	  segment	  	  Commercial	  Vehicles	  
Fiat	   Auto	   14/07/2006	   1	  
HR	  Director	  for	  Design	  &	  Engineering	  	  +	  Controller	  for	  Design	  &	  
Engineering	  
Fiat	   Auto	   11/07/2007	   2	   Chief	  Innovation	  and	  Methodologies	  
Fiat	   Auto	   11/07/2007	   2	   VP	  Design	  &	  Engineering	  (CTO),	  
Fiat	   Auto	   13/12/2007	   2	   Chief	  Innovation	  and	  Methodologies	  
Fiat	   Auto	   13/12/2007	   2	   Innovation	  and	  Methodologies	  Manager	  
Company	  A	   Sealing	  systems	   01/06/1999	   2	  	   Plant	  Director	  
Company	  A	   Sealing	  systems	   01/06/1999	   2	  	   Program	  Manager	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Company	  B	   Air	  bag,	  steering	  wheel,	  seat	  belt	   23/06/1999	   3	  	   Plant	  Director	  
Fiat	  Research	  
Centre	  (2)	  
Fiat	  Research	  Centre	   25/06/1999	   5	  	   New	  Product	  Development	  Methodologies	  Manager	  
Fiat	  Research	  
Centre	  (2)	  
Fiat	  Research	  Centre	   1/04/2003	   3	  
New	  Product	  Development	  Methodologies	  Manager	  +	  Assistant	  
to	  the	  New	  Product	  Development	  Methodologies	  Director	  
Fiat	  Research	  
Centre	  (2)	  
Fiat	  Research	  Centre	   2/04/2003	   3	   Vehicle	  development	  division	  Manager	  
Company	  R	  
Plastic	  components	  (e.g.,	  fuel	  
tanks,	  brake	  clutches)	  
29/06/99	   3	   CEO	  +	  Plant	  Director	  
Company	  B	   Air	  bag,	  steering	  wheel,	  seat	  belt	   26/07/1999	   5	   Program	  Manager	  
Company	  C	  
Car	  design	  development,	  turnkey	  
development	  projects/supplier	  
27/07/1999	   4	   Program	  Manager	  
Company	  C	  
Car	  design	  development,	  turnkey	  
development	  projects/supplier	  
27/06/1999	   1	   Program	  Manager	  
Company	  D	   Cables,	  switchers	   28/07/99	   2	   Program	  Manager	  
Company	  E	  
Safety	  systems	  (airbags,	  seat	  belts,	  
brakes,	  chassis	  control	  (ABS	  –	  
traction	  control	  systems,	  etc.)	  
/supplier	  
29/09/99	   3	   Plant	  Director	  
Company	  F	  
Power	  train,	  exhaust	  systems,	  
electronics,	  thermal	  systems,	  
lighting	  systems,	  suspensions,	  etc.	  
21/04/1998	   2	   Program	  Manager	  (Electronics	  Division)	  
Company	  F	  
Power	  train,	  exhaust	  systems,	  
electronics,	  thermal	  systems,	  
lighting	  systems,	  suspensions,	  etc.	  
21/04/1998	   2	   Program	  Manager	  (Power	  train	  Division)	  
Company	  F	  
Power	  train,	  exhaust	  systems,	  
electronics,	  thermal	  systems,	  
lighting	  systems,	  suspensions,	  etc.	  
27/04/1998	   1	   Product	  Planning	  Manager	  
Company	  G	   Stamped	  parts	  in	  metal/supplier	   17/04/1998	   4	   Plant	  director	  
Company	  H	   Sealing	  systems	   21/02/2006	   2	   Plant	  General	  Manager	  
Company	  H	   Sealing	  systems	   21/02/2006	   3	   Assistant	  to	  Technical	  Director	  Engineering	  &	  Design	  	  
Company	  H	   Sealing	  systems	   21/02/2006	   3	   Quality	  Manager	  
Company	  H	   Sealing	  systems	   07/06/2006	   1	   Assistant	  to	  Technical	  Director	  Engineering	  &	  Design	  
Company	  I	   Brakes	   28/03/2006	   1	   Product	  Engineering	  R&D	  Manager	  Brake	  Systems	  
Company	  I	   Brakes	   28/03/2006	   1	   Business	  Development	  Director	  
Company	  L	  
Car	  design	  development,	  turnkey	  
development	  projects/supplier	  
23/03/2006	   1	   Business	  Strategy	  Development	  Manager	  
Company	  L	  
Car	  design	  development,	  turnkey	  
development	  projects/supplier	  
23/03/2006	   2	   Project	  Manager	  	  
Company	  L	  
Car	  design	  development,	  turnkey	  
development	  projects/supplier	  
23/03/2006	   2	   Numerical	  simulation	  director	  
Company	  L	  
Car	  design	  development,	  turnkey	  
development	  projects/supplier	  
15/05/2006	   2	   Customer	  Manager	  
Company	  L	  
Car	  design	  development,	  turnkey	  
development	  projects/supplier	  
15/05/2006	   3	   Body	  and	  trim	  engineering	  department	  
Company	  M	  
Car	  electronic	  systems,	  power	  
train,	  lighting	  systems,	  car	  
entertainment	  systems,	  etc.	  	  
29/03/2006	   4	  
Manager	  Automotive	  Technology	  Product	  Planning	  and	  Marketing	  
+	  Cross	  Functional	  Project	  Manager	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Company	  N	   Car	  interiors,	  seats/supplier	   9/02/2006	   2	   CEO	  
Company	  N	   Car	  interiors,	  seats/supplier	   9/02/2006	   1	   Fiat	  Account	  Manager	  
Company	  N	   Car	  interiors,	  seats/supplier	   23/03/2006	   2	   Fiat	  	  Account	  Manager	  
Company	  O	  
Safety	  systems	  (airbags,	  seat	  belts,	  
brakes,	  chassis	  control	  (ABS	  –	  
traction	  control	  systems,	  etc.)	  
/supplier	  
9/02/2006	   3	   Fiat	  Account	  Director	  
Company	  O	  
Safety	  systems	  (airbags,	  seat	  belts,	  
brakes,	  chassis	  control	  (ABS	  –	  
traction	  control	  systems,	  etc.)	  
/supplier	  
9/02/2006	   3	  
Manager	  Programs	  &	  Application	  Engineering	  Inflatable	  Restraint	  
Systems	  
Company	  O	  
Safety	  systems	  (airbags,	  seat	  belts,	  
brakes,	  chassis	  control	  (ABS	  –	  
traction	  control	  systems,	  etc.)	  
/supplier	  
23/03/2006	   2	   Fiat	  	  Account	  Director	  
Company	  O	  
Safety	  systems	  (airbags,	  seat	  belts,	  
brakes,	  chassis	  control	  (ABS	  –	  
traction	  control	  systems,	  etc.)	  
/supplier	  
23/03/2006	   1	  
Manager	  Programs	  &	  Application	  Engineering	  Inflatable	  Restraint	  
Systems	  
Company	  P	   Stamped	  parts	  in	  metal/supplier	   3/02/2006	   5	   Plant	  manager	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   3/04/2006	   2	   Sales	  &	  Marketing	  General	  Manager	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   3/04/2006	   2	   Fiat	  /GM/	  sales	  manager	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   3/04/2006	   2	   R&D	  Thermal	  Systems	  Division	  Manager	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   15/11/2007	   2	   R&D	  A/C	  systems	  –	  Systems	  Eng	  &	  Concept	  Manager	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   15/11/2007	   1	   Fiat	  Account	  Manager	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   10/01/2008	   2	   PSA	  Account	  Manager	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   10/01/2008	   2	   Responsable	  Application	  PSA	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   10/01/2008	   2	   Renault	  Account	  Manager	  
Company	  Q	   Thermal	  systems	   12/02/2008	   2	   Responsable	  Application	  Renault	  
Company	  R	  
Car	  design	  development,	  turnkey	  
development	  projects/supplier	  
21/05/2008	  
	  
	  5	  
Director	  Innovation,	  Manager	  Innovation	  and	  Technology,	  	  
Total	  of	  19	  
companies	  
	  	   	  	  
Total	  of	  
145	  hours	  
	  	  
	  
 
 
